2012
Outsourcing a Two-Level Service Process
Lee H, Pinker E, Shumsky R. Outsourcing a Two-Level Service Process. Management Science 2012, 58: 1569-1584. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1503.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchStructure choiceOptimal incentive-compatible contractsService processLabour cost advantagesIncentive compatible contractsCustomer waiting costsCustomer problemsOperations managementOutsourcing optionBest contractCoordination conditionsWaiting costsCost advantageContractsClient preferencesClientsTwo-level processLariviereCostGatekeepersChoicePreferencesExpertsVendorsDecisions
2008
Call Center Outsourcing Contracts Under Information Asymmetry
Hasija S, Pinker E, Shumsky R. Call Center Outsourcing Contracts Under Information Asymmetry. Management Science 2008, 54: 793-807. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1070.0804.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchAsymmetric Competition in B2B Spot Markets
Etzion H, Pinker E. Asymmetric Competition in B2B Spot Markets. Production And Operations Management 2008, 17: 150-161. DOI: 10.3401/poms.1080.0014.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchB2B spot marketSpot marketMarket demandContract benefitsForward contractsTypes of suppliersSelling channelMarket gainsInventory liquidationIndustry supplyStrategic behaviorSuppliersHigher incentivesMarketMarket supplyContractsIndustryAsymmetric competitionDemandLiquidationIncentivesBenefitsCompetitionSupply
2003
Optimizing the use of contingent labor when demand is uncertain
Pinker E, Larson R. Optimizing the use of contingent labor when demand is uncertain. European Journal Of Operational Research 2003, 144: 39-55. DOI: 10.1016/s0377-2217(01)00378-2.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchVariety of contractsBenefits of flexibilityContingent workersTemporary workersContingent laborMinimum payRegular workersWorkforce managementFinite planning horizonCall workersStaffing decisionsTiming of informationBacklog costsContractsPlanning horizonWorkersDynamic programming problemLaborPayOptimization problemComputational effortNumerical examplesWorkforceDemandProgramming problem
2001
Contingent Labor Contracting Under Demand and Supply Uncertainty
Milner J, Pinker E. Contingent Labor Contracting Under Demand and Supply Uncertainty. Management Science 2001, 47: 1046-1062. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.47.8.1046.10233.Peer-Reviewed Original ResearchSupply uncertaintyLong-term contractsSupply agenciesLabor supplyOptimal contractContract parametersAvailability uncertaintyProductivity uncertaintyLabor contractingFirmsContractsContingent laborContract negotiationsMathematical modelDemandUncertaintySupplyContractingOptimal wayAgenciesLaborLarge rangeProductivityModelNegotiations